CASE STUDY: E-VOTING

Case Study e-Voting

Case Study: e-Voting

Question 1:

a) Identify two suitable biometric methods to be used for e-Voting in the UK. How reliable, usable and scalable are they likely to prove in practice? Identify any known security vulnerabilities (such as so-called "spoofing attacks").

the following are two suitable biometric methods which can be used for e-Voting in the UK.

Fingerprint: Fingerprint scanners are likely the most routinely utilised biometric system; as and restore the pin cipher application to unlock the business card, particularly in the locality of smartcard readers. Similar systems encompass hand geometry or palmprints [html1] [html4].

Iris. Another static house of individuals are eyes. One can either use images of the person's iris or use a retina scanner that scans body-fluid vessels to conceive an individual facts and numbers set.

Face. The human face is furthermore a characteristic that can be utilised by biometric systems. Human face acknowledgement by investigating the dimensions and place of distinct facial characteristics is being shoved for use at some aerodromes to boost security. Another likely set about is to make infrared recordings and investigate the producing facial thermogram [html3].

Voice:  A more behavioural individual facet of humans are their voices. Everybody has a exceptional mode and pitch while speaking. Voice acknowledgement endeavours to analyse these characteristics and use them to recognise a individual (Anderson 2007a).

b) What evidence is there to suggest that there is public support for biometric enabled eVoting? You are encouraged to critically refer to any evidence derived from within the UK and also from outside the UK, where e-Voting has been piloted or otherwise adopted.

Initially, we will focus on the infrastructure needed to use biometric input as the authentication entails for an e-Voting system. As currently cited before, we will not gaze at localized biometric assesses, for demonstration fingerprint scanner on the intelligent business card book reader that restores the usual pin cipher, but aim on the really biometric input to the genuine e-Voting system. If we gaze at such e-Voting systems, we require having some kind of centered storage that manages the biometric templates of the users. This facts and numbers storage afresh enforces high security claims, it should be unrealistic to tamper with the biometric templates, as this would endow fraud. An strike on the templates can arrive from two directions:

 

• A third party could restore several biometric templates contrary to other templates which would permit them control the outcomes of the vote.

• Even if the risk of the overhead strike is glimpsed as neglectable, there is one attacker that has a much more direct get access to the biometric templates: the government. This undoes a somewhat directly ahead path to control the votes in a favourable main heading for the actually ruling party. One may state now that this is currently likely - as numerous demonstrations have regrettably shown - even if utilising “old-style” paper votes. (Andersen 2001)

However, the hazard of this occurrence unnoticed is much larger. In a paper founded voting design, large scale deception engages a large ...