Genocide and America

Genocide and America

With the onset of the genocide in April 1994, the RPF launched into Rwanda; by mid-July, it had forced the genocidal regime out of Rwanda. On October 4, 1993, a day before the UN Security Council authorized a UN mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), RPF representatives met with U.S. Ambassador Johnnie Carson to criticize Rwandan President Habyarimana's "attempt to dilute the responsibilities of cabinet positions given to the RPF and opposition parties as a part of the Arusha agreement". As recorded in this October 6 telegram, they also noted the delay in the arrival of a neutral international force and inquired as to whether the U.S. would contribute troops. Presaging the international response eight months later, Ambassador Carson replied that delays were due to "concerns about the precise mission of the force and budget pressures", noting that "the UN and its member states just have other preoccupations these days."

Nevertheless, throughout the crisis, considerable U.S. resources-diplomatic, intelligence and military-and sizable bureaucracies of the U.S. government-were trained on Rwanda. This system collected and analyzed information and sent it up to decision-makers so that all options could be properly considered and 'on the table'. Officials, particularly at the middle levels, sometimes met twice daily, drafting demarches, preparing press statements, meeting or speaking with foreign counterparts and other interlocutors, and briefing higher-ups. Indeed, the story of Rwanda for the U.S. is that officials knew so much, but still decided against taking action or leading other nations to prevent or stop the genocide. Despite Rwanda's low ranking in importance to U.S. interests, Clinton Administration officials had tremendous capacity to be informed--and were informed--about the slaughter there; as noted author Samantha Power writes "any failure to fully appreciate the genocide stemmed from political, moral, and imaginative weaknesses, not informational ones."

In that Geneva is the headquarters of numerous governmental and non-governmental humanitarian agencies, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in Geneva also yielded information up to Washington policymakers. For example, in Geneva U.S. officials had regular access to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the lone humanitarian agency to remain in Rwanda throughout the genocide. Geneva hosted the special session on May 24-25 of the UN Human Rights Commission, at which the U.S. delegation acknowledged that "acts of genocide" had occurred in Rwanda. Geneva was also the headquarters of the recently-established UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, whose first representative visited Rwanda in early May. This April 30 telegram reports on a meeting of a working group established to address Rwanda's humanitarian crisis, noting "up to half a million people" could flee to Tanzania.

In order to commit genocide, serious psychological problems must be taking place. Many studies have shown how minds can be altered and cause violence and rage. Some of the leaders of these exterminations have never had love in their life, and therefore, feel no guilt. This lack of love and compassion causes a lack of neurotransmitters in their brain which can cause violent and destructive ...