JUSTICE AND DIVERSITY

Justice and Diversity



Justice and Diversity

Introduction

The domain of justice is often divided into distributive and retributive justice. Since retributivism is only one of several competing theories of just punishment, it is better to distinguish between distributive and criminal justice. Theories of distributive justice attempt to articulate, order, and justify principles that specify just distributions of benefits and burdens (other than punishments). There are, however, several other categories for the moral assessment of distributions—in addition to being just or unjust, they may be generous or niggardly, humane or inhumane. A just distribution is one in which each receives that which is her due. Generosity might speak in favor of giving someone more than her due (Smart & Bernard, 1985, 105-111).

Discussion

At least in the modern era (beginning roughly with the natural rights theorists, including Grotius [1583-1645], Pufendorf [1632-1694], and Locke [1632-1704]), the tendency has been to identify one's due with that to which one has a right. In addition to the relatively uninformative claim that what is just is giving each her due or that to which she has a right, there is also near universal agreement among competing theories on the formal principle of justice: equals are to be treated equally. The latter principle is not to be confused with a material principle of justice that states a presumption in favor of equality: distribution is to be equal unless morally decisive reasons can be given for unequal treatment (Rawls, 1971, 88-93).

The task of a theory of distributive justice is to specify and defend material principles of justice. Such principles would speak to at least two issues (Daniels, 1975, 74-83):

To what characteristics of persons is the formal principle to be applied— (Individuals will be equal in some respects but unequal in others, and not all of the respects in which they are equal are relevant from the standpoint of justice.)

Is the material principle of equality correct— (Does justice require a presumption in favor of equal distribution—)

According to Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997), competing theories of distributive justice can be seen as alternative accounts of what the material principles of justice are.

Distributions may occur at many levels: from a parent's division of candies among her children, to the awarding of a prize to the winner of a race, to the distribution of income and wealth across the entire class of citizens through the operation of complex institutional rules. As a rough generalization, it can be said that ancient moral philosophy focused primarily, or at least initially, upon the justice of individual actions and upon justice as a virtue of individuals, while contemporary theories have tended to take the primary subject of justice to be the basic Institutions of the nation-state, devoting scant attention to the justice of micro-level distributions and to justice as a virtue of individuals rather than of social institutions (Cohen, 1978, 252-259).

This generalization must be qualified in both directions, however. For example, as Nussbaum has argued, Aristotle's (384-322 B.C.E.) Politics contains suggestive remarks toward a theory of distributive justice at ...