The Federalist

Introduction

The Federalist papers are the series of 85 articles that advocated the ratification of the Constitution of the United States. Seventy-seven of the essays were published serially in The Independent Journal and New York Packet between October 1787 and August 1788. The synthesis of these and eight others, called the Federalist, was published in 1788 JA McLean (Epstein 12).

In the Federalist papers as the main source for the interpretation of the Constitution, as they set out the philosophy and motivation of the proposed control system.

The authors of these documents as the Federalist wanted to influence the vote in favor of ratification and shape future interpretations of the Constitution. According to historian Richard B. Morris, they are "incomparable exposition of the Constitution, a classic of political science unsurpassed in breadth and depth of the product any American writer (Dietze 25).

These articles were written: • Alexander Hamilton (51 articles: nos. 1, 6-9, 11-13, 15-17, 21-36, 59-61 and 65-85) • James Madison (29 articles: nos. 10, 14, 18-20, 37-58 and 62-63), and • John Jay (5 articles: 2-5 and 64).

The Concept Of Representation In The Federalist

One of the central controversies in the history of representative government has been over the nature of the relationship between the representative and the represented. Hanna F. Pitkin has summarized the question at issue in this mandate-independence controversy as "should (must) a representative do what his constituents want, and be bound by mandates or instructions from them; or should (must) he be free to act as seems best to him in pursuit of their welfare? (Hanna 145). The central ethical issue involved in such a question is no less essential to democratic theory than the question, Who is the proper repository of governmental decisionmaking power: the mass electorate or the representatives elevated from that electorate? Should the representative view himself as being elevated in order to act according to his own judgment and conscience, or should he view himself and his role as faithfully following the will of his constituents? The latter alternative seems to value representative institutions solely for their quantitative and practical element; that is, direct democracy would be logistically impossible over any area approaching the size of a modern state (Kesler 55). On the other hand, the former contains a qualitative value assumption; that is, representatives free to exercise their own intelligence and abilities and to follow their own conscience will be more likely to make just and good decisions. It is by keeping those competing value systems in mind that we can best explore the idea of representation in the essays written by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay (Epstein 13).

Publius on Representation: The Filter

If the aim of the Constitution, as Publius instructs us, is "to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of society" (57:343), one may ask, What use could be made of the special (clearly seen to be unrepresentative) qualities of the elected representatives if they were to simply ...