THE U.S. AND THE BRITISH COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY

The U.S. Iraq Counterinsurgency Strategy and the British Counterinsurgency Strategy during the Southern Campaign of the Revolutionary War

Southern Campaign of the Revolutionary War

Introduction

The Southern theater of the American Revolutionary War was the central area of operations in North America in the second half of the American Revolutionary War. During the first three years of the conflict, the primary military encounters had been in the north, focused on campaigns around the cities of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. After the failure of the Saratoga campaign, the British largely abandoned operations in the Middle Colonies and pursued a strategy of pacification in the Southern Colonies.

Southern Campaign of the Revolutionary War a Comparison of THE British and American Southern Campaign

The defining conflict of our time never was supposed to happen. American policymakers expected a warm welcome for U.S. forces in Iraq. The Iraqi people, they believed, would be grateful for liberation.1 Iraq would move quickly toward a democratic political system and open economy. Expatriates would provide new leadership untainted—or at least less tainted—by Hussein. Iraq's own police and military would secure the country. Because the U.S. military had used precision strikes to limit damage during the march on Baghdad, recovery would be fast. Iraqi oil revenues would fund reconstruction. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the international community—once they overcame their pique at the intervention—would provide money, expertise, and peacekeepers. Iraq's neighbors, relieved at having a cancer removed from their midst, would help or at least stay out of the way. Stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq, American policymakers believed, would be easier than removing Hussein. Unfortunately, events did not follow script. As soon as the old regime was destroyed, Iraq collapsed in a nation-wide spasm of looting and street crime.

The Iraqi security forces disappeared. With nothing to take their place, violence ran unchecked. The anarchy sparked public anger which grew into a storm, gathering energy with passing weeks. For a brief interlude, little of the violence was directed against the American forces. But that did not last long. Trouble first broke out in the restive city of Fallujah, 35 miles west of Baghdad. Fallujah was insular, conservative, intensely religious, and resistant to outside control, attracting radical clerics like moths to a flame. It was a traditional hotbed of smuggling and a city where complex tribal connections mattered greatly, helping define personal loyalty, obligation, and honor. Even Saddam Hussein largely had left the place alone. It was bypassed in the original assault on Baghdad, but elements of the 82d Airborne Division arrived in late April 2003.

The citizens did not take kindly to occupation. Within a few days, a rally celebrating Saddam Hussein's birthday led to angry denunciations of the U.S. presence and heated demands for withdrawal. Shooting broke out, leaving at least 13 Iraqis dead. Two more died the next day in a second round of clashes. Attackers then tossed grenades into a U.S. Army compound. Without drawing a moral comparison, Fallujah was like Lexington and Concord—an inadvertent clash ...