Religious freedom versus Religious Acceptance during the early colonization of Massachusetts

Introduction

Brian Leiter's brilliant essay on why tolerate religion is a rich source of inspiration for those interested in the topic (whether or not they are professional legal and moral philosophers), and a thought-provoking read.

To put it very briefly (but Leiter's argument is in turn straightforward indeed, and defended without unnecessary argumentative detours), the main argument of the book is that there is no principled reason to single out religion qua religion for special legal protection. Where religion (in the guise of religious beliefs) deserves legal protection, it is in no different form and intensity than the protection assured to other claims of consciousness (such as pacifism, veganism, and what have you) (McDougall, 222).

Discussion

This is so because religion is a form of belief characterized by categoricity of requirements, and insulation from evidence and reasons; these two characteristics do not display any intrinsic moral value, and so there is no reason to treat religious belief any better than other claims of consciousness (and neither to treat it any worse, for that matter). As a consequence, the proper constitutional way to deal with claims of spiritual consciousness is a 'No-Exemptions' approach, with the possible qualification of non burden shifting exemptions.

That is a religious belief is no reason to claim an exemption against an otherwise valid law of general and impartial application. An open-ended exemptions approach would indeed jeopardize public order and safety, as well as social concerns, and would impose the relative burdens of the purported exemption on other, non religious citizens. (And the same solution applies also for non-religious claims of conscience, for that matter.) If ever, exemptions on conscientious grounds can only be granted when the relative burden does not affect others. The later portion now focuses on the religious differences and the tragedies they may tend to cause.

Toleration and freedom

In order to toleration be an issue, it must be the case that the perceived difference has to matter somehow and the affected person would have an immediate tendency to oppose, in one of many possible ways, the difference in question. As opposed to indifference, then, which is by definition unreflective attitude toleration requires reflection - the “putting up with” must be the upshot of judgment, suppressing the initial adverse reaction; to put it in different words, toleration implies reasons (Lewis, 242).

While toleration is not indifference, it is not clear that toleration is also morally superior, or preferable, to indifference; probably many people would naturally prefer their “differences” to be ignored, rather than tolerated. In fact, toleration and indifference enter the scene at different moments: the real point is that toleration is in place when indifference is not an option. Probably in some settings it would be good to be indifferent to some differences in the first place, but if this is not the case (if one happens to be adversely struck by some differences), then toleration can be the right stance to adopt - provided one has good reasons to be ...