[Writer Name]

[Supervisor Name]

Same Sex Marriage

[Date]

Same Sex Marriage

Introduction

This paper intends to discuss the conservative and liberal views on sexual morality. Moreover, the consideration of rights and same sex marriages will also be discussed. Various views related to the concept of same sex marriages will be explored within this paper. The purpose of this paper is to make the reader aware about the various underlying views related to the concept of same sex marriages.

Discussion

The marriage laws' simultaneously coercive and punitive aspects may be complementary, but they are not for that reason equivalent. The constitutional significance of the distinction between conformity and dissent, adherence to the legal norm and disrespect of it, discipline and punishment, is nowhere more salient than in the jurisprudence of substantive due process. As Professor Jed Rubenfeld argued in a critique aimed largely at Bowers, the "distinctive and singular characteristic" of laws invalidated under this doctrine is "their productive or affirmative" power, "their profound capacity to direct" the fate of individuals who accede to the state's preferences (Cantor et al Pp. 15-30).

These laws are harmful, to the point of being totalitarian, because they steer a life's "development along a particular avenue. Prohibitions of homosexual sex, for example, "channel certain individuals supposing the law is obeyed into a network of social institutions and relations that will occupy their lives. The proscription is against homosexual sex; the products are lives forced into relations with the opposite sex. So too with same-sex marriage bans, whose victims include not only longtime couples penalized for their homosexual choices but also individuals goaded into heterosexual relationships heterosexual marriages, certainly, but also the non-marital, premarital, and quasi-marital relations that so many people pursue in search of a spouse (Andryszewski Pp. 55-80).

Same-sex marriage advocates could argue, though they have not done so, that same-sex marriage bans are unconstitutional simply because they compel individuals to choose between two constitutional rights: the sexual liberty protected in Lawrence and the freedom to marry recognized example, the Supreme Court unanimously stack down a Tennessee law prohibiting clergy from manning for state office. Of the eight Justices who participated in that case, seven agreed that the statute was invalid because it conditioned a right of political participation on renunciation of a specific form of religious exercise (Stockland & Reichert Pp. 100-112).

Though Party seems readily applicable to the tension between same-sex marriage bans and the right to choose homosexual relations and relationships, the remainder of this subpart shows that these bans' burden on sexual liberty is unconstitutional regardless of whether the right to marry is timely fundamental or is fundamental only as to heterosexual unions. The law forcefully directs people to marry. States avow their policy to "favor" and "encourage" marriage, and they pursue that purpose in a bewildering array of contexts. The fact of this favoritism is one of the few points on which both sides of the same-sex marriage debate agree (Stockland & Reichert Pp. 100-112).

One side decries same-sex couples' exclusion from the numerous rights and benefits of civil ...