PHILOSOPHICAL MORALITY

Philosophical Morality

Philosophical Morality

The prevalent interpretation poses moral dilemmas as problems to be solved by moral theory. If a problem cannot be solved, the failure to solve it reflects the shortcomings of moral theory. In fact, both Edmund Pincoffs and Alasdair MacIntyre contend that there can be no moral dilemmas without moral theory.1 While I agree that moral dilemmas pose serious concerns for moral theory, I shall look at them primarily as posing serious concerns for moral agents. I shall argue that there is a normative component to one's being in a dilemma. So I am concerned not with character judgments about the products of dilemmatic deliberation and choice; instead, I concentrate on the legitimacy of making character judgments based on the very onset of a moral dilemma.

What counts as a moral dilemma is difficult to determine with exactitude, and few philosophers attempt to provide a fixed definition. But most philosophers accept that moral dilemmas are those quandaries in which an agent must choose between two or more mutually exclusive act-choices, each of which is morally required.2 The options might be good courses of action or the avoidance of bad courses of action.3 Moral dilemmas are a subset of the general class of dilemmas, which includes prudential, epistemic, religious, legal, and moral dilemmas.4 When different domains support the mutually exclusive combinations of choices, the dilemma is said to be "mixed."5 For example, one may claim religious support for illegally obstructing a woman on her way to an abortion clinic. But she may have legal support for not obstructing the clinic. In the interest of clarity, I limit subsequent discussion to mutually exclusive act-choices, both of which have moral support.

Moral Conflicts

Moral conflicts are situations in which one's moral outlook may be reasonably interpreted as imparting guidance to do two incompatible actions.

Broadly speaking, there are two major types of moral conflicts. A first type of moral conflict, discussed in some detail by Thomas Nagel and Isaiah Berlin, arises from the fact that the available options embody a plurality of incommensurable values.6 In short, the moral values that give support to each option differ in kind.7 Clear examples of such moral conflicts abound in the philosophical literature: Euthyphro must decide which value takes precedent: civic or familial.8 Jesus must decide whether to honor his parents or serve his God.9 A second type of moral conflict arises from mere contingencies of a given situation. This general conflict form finds expression in William Styron's novel Sophie??s Choice in which Sophie must choose which of her children will survive into the future.10 And Ruth Barcan Marcus poses a similar situation in which an agent must choose which twin to save from drowning.11 In this latter type, both options have comparable moral support, but because of the time, location, and other life constraints, both cannot be performed.

There are certainly hybrid cases of moral conflict in which an agent must choose between options that embody a plurality of values and that are forced by the contingencies of the ...