The Interagency specifically a Goldwater-Nichols II for the Interagency

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION1

Background of the Study1

The Goldwater-Nichols Provisions2

Research Aims and Objectives3

Aim3

Objectives3

Research Questions3

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW5

Historical Background5

Goldwater-Nichols Act6

Importance of Goldwater-Nichols Act6

Interagency8

National Security Council9

The Joint Interagency Coordination Group10

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY11

Research Design11

Qualitative Research Method11

Primary Research Methods12

Literature Search12

Keywords Used13

CHAPTER 4: PROPOSED DISCUSSION14

END NOTES15

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

At the time, the military services, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps controlled the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), dominated the unified and specified commands, circumvented the authority of the defense secretary, and provided self-serving advice to civilian leadership. In order to enhance the military's operational effectiveness, the service's longstanding ascendancy over military affairs must be diminished. Proponents of reorganization like Nunn, Goldwater, and others, focused on enhancing the efficiency of the military's command structure. General Edward Meyer, Army (Ret.), argued that the United States in 1986 was under international strategic conditions that made quicker decision-making and a more responsive defense organization mandatory. The Department of Defense (DOD) will afford to wait for a Goldwater-Nichols type act to integrate all elements of national power to fuse reconstruction efforts.

The purpose of the National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD 44 is to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. In September of 2005, DOD Deputy Secretary England directed a study team to examine organizational changes needed for DOD to manage the implementation of DOD policies and improve the Department's ability to conduct and support stability operations. The result of the study is DOD Directive 3000, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. Defense Department Directive 3000.05 addresses how DOD will coordinate with the Department of State (DOS) its responsibilities under the NSPD 44. The Department of Defense must develop the capacity to deploy and defeat a conventional threat and then transition seamless to stability and support operations with existing organizations within the DOD without having to create ad hoc teams. The United States cannot conduct conventional operations while simultaneously adequately conducting stability/support operations. The DOD civil affairs capability is neither sufficient nor suited for the strain of current or future operations. Conventional warfare, counterinsurgent warfare, and stability and construction operations all require different force structures, training, and equipping. United States combat forces, as currently educated and trained, are not the correct personnel resource for stability operations. Future military operations must be carefully planned around political concerns and timing of reserve call-ups.

The Goldwater-Nichols Provisions

There were dozens of provisions in the GNA that strove to achieve the following 8 objectives:

Strengthen civilian authority

Improve military advice to civilians

Clarify the Commander in Chiefs' (of the unified and specified commands, a.k.a. CINCs) responsibilities for the unified commands

Ensure the CINCs' authority are commensurate with their responsibilities

Increase attention to strategy and contingency planning

Economize defense resources

Improve joint officer management policy

Enhance DOD's management and administration

Research Aims and Objectives

Aim

The aim of this research study will ...