Agroterrorism

Overview of Agroterrorism

The potential for terrorist attacks against agricultural targets (agroterrorism) is increasingly recognized as a national security threat, especially after the events of September 11, 2001. In this context, agroterrorism is defined as the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal of generating fear over the safety of food, causing economic losses, and/or undermining social stability. The response to the threat of agroterrorism has come to be called "food defense."

An agroterrorist event would usually involve bioterrorism, since likely vectors include pathogens such as a viruses, bacteria, or fungi. People more generally associate bioterrorism with outbreaks of human illness (e.g., anthrax or smallpox), rather than diseases affecting animals or plants.

The goal of agroterrorism is not killing cows or plants. These are the means to the end of causing economic crises in the agricultural and food industries, social unrest, and loss of confidence in government. Human health could be at risk through contaminated food or if an animal pathogen is transmissible to humans (zoonotic).

While agriculture may not be a terrorist's first choice because it lacks the "shock factor" of more traditional terrorist targets, an increasing number of terrorism analysts consider it a viable secondary target.2 Agroterrorism could be a low-cost but highly effective means toward an al-Qaeda goal of destroying the United States' economy. Evidence that agriculture and food are potential al Qaeda targets came in 2002 when terrorist hideouts in Afghanistan were found containing agricultural documents and manuals describing ways to make animal and plant poisons.

Agriculture has several characteristics that pose unique problems:

Farms are geographically disbursed in unsecured environments (e.g., open fields and pastures throughout the countryside). While some livestock are housed in facilities that can be secured, agriculture generally requires large expanses of land that are difficult to secure.

Livestock frequently are concentrated in confined locations (e.g., feedlots with thousands of cattle in open-air pens, farms with tens of thousands of pigs, or barns with hundreds of thousands of poultry) allowing diseases to infect more animals quickly. Concentration in slaughter, processing also makes large scale contamination possible.

The number of lethal and contagious biological agents is greater for plants and animals than for humans. Most of these diseases are environmentally resilient, endemic in foreign countries, and not harmful to humans - making it easier for terrorists to acquire, handle, and deploy the pathogens.

Live animals, grain, and processed food products are routinely transported and commingled in the production and processing system. These factors circumvent natural barriers that could slow pathogenic dissemination.

International trade in livestock, grains, and food products is often tied to disease-free status. The presence (or rumor4) of certain pests or diseases in a country can quickly stop exports of a commodity, cause domestic consumption to drop, disrupt commodities markets, and can take months or years to recover.

The past success of keeping many diseases out of the U.S. means that many veterinarians and scientists lack direct experience with foreign diseases. This may delay recognition of symptoms in case of an outbreak, and ...