FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Freedom of Expression

Freedom of Expression

Introduction

To answer this charge of irrationality is the main task of a philosophical defense of freedom of expression. To answer this, we need a clear account of what class of protected acts is, and then an explanation of the nature and grounds of its privilege. One thing which an adequate, philosophical account of freedom of expression should do is to make clear in what way the definition of the class of protected acts and the justification for their privilege depend upon a balancing of competing goals or interests and to what extent they rest instead on rights or other absolute, i.e. nonconsequentialist, principles. In particular, one would like to know to what extent a defender of freedom of expression must rest his case on the claim that the long-term benefits of free discussion will outweigh certain patent and possibly severe short-run costs, and to what extent this calculation of long-term advantage depends upon placing an exceptional value for knowledge and intellectual pursuits, as opposed to other values. This paper attempts to find these extents using the perspectives of the scholars like Scanlon, Greenawalt and Amdur.

Discussion

There are three principal types of harm that result from offensive utterances made about a particular group in a society: (1) those which produced by a violent reaction by the victims of group vilification, (2) those which result from violence committed by other persons incited by “vilifiers" to assault the victims of racial vilification, and (3) those which consist of the very utterance of offensive words, regardless of any further violence committed.

Types of harm may be identified as ensuing from racial vilification. For one thing, one may argue that there is harm to the society, regardless of any more specific harm inflicted upon the direct targets of racial vilification (Amdur, 1980). The broadcasting or publication of material which is offensive to particular racial or ethnic groups is damaging, not only to those directly offended, but also to the community: it degrades the standards of everyday life, of civility, of the quality or public discourse. Further, it undermines social peace and harmony, and the entire society suffers.

This may well be true, yet these harms will not be considered here as separate categories distinct from the three principle types of harm listed above. The reason is that these harms are either weaker than, or derivative from, the three principal harms. A case based on the harm that consists of the lowering of the standards of civility in a given society is arguably weaker than a case based on the harm that consists of provoking violence or inflicting psychic harm upon the target of vilification. One may well imagine that a society may be prepared to abandon uniform standards of civility on the basis of, say, a libertarian view about unrestrained self-expression. However, this does not dispose or the argument regarding harm inflicted upon the victims of vilification. At any rate, it is questionable whether a liberal society may enforce, through legal means, its ...