IBGM INTERNATIONAL AND CROSS-BOUNDARY TRADE LAW

IBGM International and Cross-Boundary Trade Law

IBGM International and Cross-Boundary Trade Law

Task 2

WTO dispute resolution process

Dispute-settlement cases in the World Trade Organization are heard by small panels of "trade experts" appointed from among a small coterie of trade officials and lawyers. In many cases, they have little or no expertise in the non-legal issues in question, particularly environmental, scientific or social concerns. Most are ideologically predisposed to oppose public-interest regulations and to support unrestricted commerce. Despite this built-in bias, the process includes no safeguards against conflict of interest on the part of the judges(Lowenfeld 2002 pp.90).

Implicit in WTO treaties themselves are strong presumptions in favor of "free" trade that must be followed in rulings. They push the burden onto national governments to justify any public protections that have even a minimal effect on trade, rendering them guilty until proven innocent. The process and records of WTO dispute-settlement bodies are closed. They allow no input—such as amicus briefs—from interested non-governmental organizations (unless NGOs can convince a government to submit them) and no unofficial observers. They produce no public record of deliberations, only a final ruling(Panizzon 2006 pp.23).

The operation of the WTO dispute settlement process involves the parties and third parties to a case and may also involve the DSB panels, the Appellate Body, the WTO Secretariat, arbitrators, independent experts, and several specialized institutions.The General Council discharges its responsibilities under the DSU through the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). Like the General Council, the DSB is composed of representatives of all WTO Members. The DSB is responsible for administering the DSU, i.e. for overseeing the entire dispute settlement process. It also has the authority to establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of rulings and recommendations, and authorize the suspension of obligations under the covered agreements. The DSB meets as often as necessary to adhere to the timeframes provided for in the DSU(Lowenfeld 2002 pp.90).

Challenger countries have won the great majority of WTO disputes. And many developing nations do not have the resources to mount or defend a case before the WTO. Because of the prohibitive costs of defense, poorer countries are more susceptible to even threats of challenges to their laws by wealthier countries.

Compared with the International Court of Justice (World Court) and other similar international judicial bodies, the WTO dispute-settlement process lacks legitimacy because of its built-in bias, lack of due-process protections, exclusivity and closed proceedings. Yet its coercive force multiplies the effects of all the other injustices built into the WTO.

WTO claim against the U.S.

Advantages

America's goal is to use the WTO as a tool to negotiate the best possible outcomes for U.S. workers, farmers and manufacturers. Recently, America was an active participant in helping Saudi Arabia to join the WTO, Ukraine and Vietnam to complete bilateral market agreements and Russia to negotiate bilateral market access. Once party to a WTO agreement, the U.S. can appeal to the WTO court of appeal to ensure that participating nations conduct their international trade transactions ...