Identity Theory

Identity Theory

Arguments for the Identity Theory

In simplistic terms, the Identity Theory of the mind holds that mind states and mind processes are, in fact, the same, or identical, to those of the brain. This abandonment of earlier dualism can generally be termed physicalist or materialist, but for the purpose of this essay I shall be using the former. Early proponents of this theory hold that mental events can be identified by corresponding physical events; Hence the mysticism previously attached to the workings of the mind pre-twentieth century, can be brought down to earth and to the purely physical realm. E.G Boring may well have been the first to use the term 'Identity Theory' in 1933, and it should be noted that its place in history, as a theory, is fundamental to its basis, which, naturally, relies on the development of science and great leaps in empirical discovery into the nature and composition of neural states and stimuli; but it must also be noted that due to the imposing but not entirely conclusive scientific evidence thus far, the Identity Theory must still be regarded, as Ullin T. Place describes it, as a scientific hypothesis, rather than a scientific fact.

The causal argument disposes of any vague notions of correspondence stating, in loose terms, that because we can find 'full physical causes' for many effects of mental events/processes, and because it seems illogical to suppose they are caused 'twice over,' that what we perceive to be mental events/processes previously viewed to be distinct, are, in fact, identical to physical events/processes.

Objections to Identity Theory

There are many challenges to identity theory. Critics of the identity theory have drawn special attention to the cases of alleged infringements of Leibniz's Law of the indiscernibility of identicals, according to which the two objects are identical if, and ...