Kant and Duty - Grounding for the Metaphysics of Moral

Introduction

Immanuel Kant was a philosopher who lived from 1724 to 1804. He wrote three books on the subject of moral philosophy: "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals," "Critique of Practical Reason" and "Metaphysics of Morals." All three related to the idea of moral or ethical duty, with reference to what he called the "Categorical Imperative." Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals aims to isolate and examine a “pure, moral philosophy completed cleansed of everything that can only be empirical and appropriate to anthropology.” Through a “critique of pure, practical reason,” Kant attempts “to seek out and establish the supreme principle of morality.” He begins by asking what is unconditionally good. He rejects a number of obvious answers (such as achieving satisfactory results, conforming to moral principles) as being too qualified or restricted. Instead, he argues that a “good will” is “good in itself,” that is, good even if it has no or even negative consequences (Bustos, 241-54). To support this claim that a good will is unconditionally good, Kant turns to the function of reason. Starting from the assumption that everything in nature has a purpose, he asks what the purpose of reason is. The instincts are adequate for obtaining self-preservation (and often happiness), so what function does the organ of reason serve? His answer is that the purpose of reason “is to have influence on the will; its true operate must be to develop a will which is beneficial, not as a entails to some encourage finish, but in itself.” Reason produces a will that allows the individual to act morally good for “the sake of duty.” Rather than acting according to inclinations or to achieve a purpose, a rational being act out of a “reverence” for the law (Baron, 147-70). This good will is unconditioned by any specific or individual interests, and its principle can be restated in more standard terms: “I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law” (Bustos, 241-54). At this point, Kant attacks prevailing philosophy, which relies too much on examples. He argues that moral concepts not derived from contingent, empirical experience but a priori reason. “Only a intellectual constituting has the ability to act in accordance with his estimate of polices that is, in conformity with precepts—and exclusively so has a determination” (Bustos, 241-54). For a perfect being, such as god, reason and will would be in complete agreement, and there would be no need for the former to correct the latter. For mankind, however, reason is not always in perfect accord with the will: there can be a divergence of objective and subjective principles (Sherman, 369-77).

Reason acts upon the will through a command, an “imperative.” “All imperatives expressed by an ought.' By this they mark the relation of an objective law of reason to a will which is not necessarily determined by this law in virtue of its ...