MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFRICAN POLITICS (CONGO)

Military Intervention in African Politics: The Democratic Republic of Congo as a Case Study



Military Intervention in African Politics: The Democratic Republic of Congo as a Case Study

Introduction

This paper refers to patterns of influence, control, and subordination between the armed forces and the wider social environment. As an instrument of legitimate coercion, the military plays a key role in its response to civilian initiative or civilian control strategies and the military's willingness to capitulate in Democratic Republic of Congo (David, 2005: p106). Accordingly, two potentially conflicting principles underlie civil-military relations: the need to have protection by the military and the need to have protection from the military.

Despite Huntington's dominance in the field of civil-military relations for the past four decades, a study of the Congo's experience suggests that his conception of civil-military relations is not applicable to that country. Instead of the dichotomised relationship that Huntington hypothesised, the situation in the Congo was much more complicated. General Mobutu used the same civilian mechanisms of control to remain in power, as he was predisposed to think like a politician even when dealing with intra-military dealings (Samuel, 2003: p45). Over the years, he developed different types of civil-military relations that combined a mix of civilian control and a military coercive apparatus that helped him to remain in power for three decades.

Janowitz (2004) identifies five types of civil-military relations in the developing world: democratic-competitive and semi competitive systems, civil-military coalitions, military oligarchy, authoritarian-personal control, and authoritarian mass-party systems (Janowitz, 2004). In the first group, civilian supremacy operates to limit the role of the military in part because the colonial traditions implanted a strong sense of self-restraint in the military (Charles, 2004: p41). The existence of competing civilian institutions and interest groups permits a measure of political competition. Civil-military coalitions, however, represent polities in which civilians are in power because of the support they receive from the military, which remains a political actor and may act as an informal umpire between competing political groups. In some instances, the military may be forced to install a caretaker government with a view to returning power to civilians. But caretaker governments are usually unstable because they eventually force the military to assume an ever greater role in politics. The result is Janowitz's third model, called military oligarchy, which represents an effective military rule.

The fourth type of civil-military relations is the authoritarian-personal type, a system that occurs when rulers have firm control over the military. To remain in office, leaders develop a cult of personality and their rule relies on traditional or personal power. The military plays no role in domestic politics at this point. Although the armed forces represent sovereignty, rulers reserve to themselves all significant decisions concerning the military, thereby weakening military effectiveness (Michael, 2002: p315).

Janowitz's final model is the authoritarian-party system, in which the ruler dominates all political events and remains politically strong. Because the military is small, it is dominated by civilians and is excluded from domestic politics. The ruler also balances the power of the military with a paramilitary institution whose role is to protect the leader (Michael, 2002).

Unlike Huntington, Janowitz's five models center on the assumption that military rule is not a departure from the norm of civilian leadership, because political activities of the military in developing countries range from performing minimal governmental functions essential for any nation-state ...