PERSONAL IDENTITY

Personal Identity

Personal Identity

Introduction

In this research paper I will discuss the different conditions for not remaining the same person over time, as well as conditions of remaining responsible for an action over time. In the traditional literature, as the quote from Searle above suggests, writers have assumed that remaining the same person over time is a necessary and sufficient condition for remaining responsible for an action that the person has committed.

Discussion

One's core psychology consists in what a person shares with other people, whereas one's distinctive psychology consists in a set of particular psychological states that he shares with no one else. We said that the relevant part of the distinctive psychology for responsibility is the set of higher order attitudes that the person has. It is the fact that he approves of some of his desires and disapproves of others that makes him the subject of moral responsibility, and that makes him capable of holding other people responsible for their actions, and hence capable of understanding what moral responsibility entails. This is also what makes him part of the moral community, and these higher order attitudes, as I have argued in previous chapters, ground both personhood and moral responsibility.

It is therein that one's moral character lies. What makes me a different person from you is that I have a different moral character, so what makes someone a person (in our sense of the term) is that he has a character. One's moral character comprises of higher order attitudes which make one a particular person. They make up the part of our distinctive psychology that is relevant for responsibility. These higher order attitudes are what make one a particular being who can be held responsible for one's action at a given time. Since it is these higher order attitudes that ground personhood and responsibility, these are what make one a particular person at a given time.

Since what defines personhood is a set of higher order attitudes, what constitutes personhood over time must have something to do with that as well. One natural thing to conclude is that in order for one to remain the same person (in our sense of the term) over time, the later person has to have a sufficiently similar set of higher order attitudes to that of the earlier person. In other words, if the later person has enough attitudes that are different ...