Egypt's Revolution of 2011 (the Egyptian revolution - passion - revolution lotus Let us look at popular revolt in Egypt on January 25, 2011 What for people who show objection Charcot where the lack of political freedoms and a state of emergency and increased poverty and the difficulty the presence of jobs and police brutality, and lack of housing and dignified living and excessive rise in food prices, and the spread of corruption, and lack of free elections and we might add the lack of freedom of expression and poor living conditions. Egypt's Revolution of 2011 is of a series of street demonstrations and protests and acts of civil disobedience and de the largest demonstrations them out of Egypt-hour demonstrations in 1977
The current Egyptian crisis at best creates a heightened level of uncertainty for Israel and at its worse a fundamental reordering of the power structure of the region. Clearly there is little that the Jewish state can or ought to do at this moment. But for Israel to now possibly face a destabilized Egypt on its flank will not be a comforting notion. But far more problematic would be reordering of the power base in Cairo with the emergence of an array of forces that may well reject the current state of relations with the Jewish State in favor of aligning the Arab World's largest country with those forces who are committed to the destruction of Israel (Al-Shalchi, 22).
The focus of mob anger and the character of the demonstrations reflect a series of internal messages to the respective governments about economic and social policies and with regard to political access and representation. These grassroots expressions are not about the Arab-Israel conflict. For those who tie the politics of the Middle East exclusively to the policies of the State of Israel, these national expressions in support of democratic ideals refute such a scenario (Al-Shalchi, 5).
But the strategic concerns as a result of these events are clearly not limited to Jerusalem. Across the region Arab leaders are watching generally with grave concern, in turn a few players are viewing these events. The “traditionalist” camp within the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Jordan and Morocco, ought to be extremely worried about the chain of events unfolding in Cairo. The real possibilities for revolutionary change may well not be limited to Tunisia or to Egypt. To maintain the status quo will seem much more problematic for these regimes, and the fall-out for Western interests could be far reaching, and potentially challenging as there is the possibility for a significant shift in the region's balance of power. Should radical regime change occur, these current friends of the United States could abruptly disconnect or alter their relationships with Washington.
On the other hand, the “rejectionist” front led by Iran and supported by Syria and its allies, Hezbollah and Hamas, see the potential here to redefine the power balance in the region (Headway, 6).
Radical Islamic forces are quick to understand that the ...