Profiling for Airport Security in the United States of America

Introduction

The terrible events of September 11, 2001, galvanized the boss and legislative branches of the federal government to proceed rapidly to evolve an airport security system that would supply a higher grade of security. There were alternate techniques of activity available. The nation could upgrade the present system, shift the whole responsibility to airport managers, or federalize the security system.

The simplest course of action was to change the present system by upgrading the quality of the service.(Barclay,12) The FAA could take the lead and need the airlines to squeeze their contracts with the private security firms to charter completely qualified screeners, to run strict background checks, to need more training, and establish a solid internal audit system. The FAA itself could be needed to establish and vigorously enforce higher screening standards. Withering fines or dismissal could be levied for failure of the private firms to rendezvous the standards that would be subjected to continuous testing.

The feeling of the Congress, although, was to question the use of private screeners, especially Argenbright, whose past performance did not invoke confidence. Moreover, conviction in the oversight capacity of the FAA was shaken by the GAO's and other reports on the agency's performance.(Mead,54) Further, the precarious financial situation facing the airlines immediately next 9/11 did not bode well for their capacity to sustain the much higher costs that squeezed screening would entail.

Consequently, this alternative procedure of increasing the grade of airport security was rejected. Others would then have to be considered.(Barclay,12) Changing the focal issue of command to airport managers, in alignment to establish a completely integrated system, was also a possibility. This alternative probable would have preceded the regulatory function of the FAA, but it would deal exactly with airports that would be charged with the whole security function.

Thesis Statement

Security was the joint responsibility of airport operators, airlines, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

Counter Argument

Airport managers could contract with private security firms or they could evolve their own security forces. They would be responsible for screening and for commanding all access to the aircraft and to the airport itself. Airports would have to investment the security operation, with or without government aid.

Airports, although, would still be probable to consider only the benefits to them of intensified security, rather than the broader social benefits.(Mead,54) Their major anxiety would still be the convenience to their customers and the pleasantness of the airport natural environment rather than a tighter, more rigid screening system that would inconvenience the traveler. Consequently, airports would probable under invest in security.

Airport managers did not warmly endorse this alternative procedure of security. They were worried about the financial obligations implicit in this procedure, and with the prospect of even more common dealings with the FAA, which probable would be the primary regulatory agency. Apparently, without the strong support of the airports, most of who are belongs to by local governments; this alternative was not granted serious consideration.(Barclay,12)

It is approximated that for fiscal year ...