Evaluation of U.S. military campaign planning for OIF from 2002 to 2007
Outline for OIF
Opening/Introduction Paragraph. This essay evaluates the U.S. military campaign planning for Iraq through the lens of the elements of operational design as explained in Joint Publication 5-0.
Overview of OIF
OIF operation is divided in phases
End state objectives not completed achieved
US administration unable to get the desired results
Hard lessons learned because of gaps in planning
Ill management of coalition forces
Lack of coordination between departments
Lack of responsibility
General Tommy Franks, the commander of US CENTCOM being the central authority of the operational design devised a plan for establishment elimination in Iraq. The problem identified by the CENTCOM was the autocracy of Saddam Hussein that was to be eliminated. According to the US military planners, the mission was going to end in 125 days as they identified the operational environment of the project as a difficult one in which, they could face strong resistance from Iraqi forces. While planning for a combat in Iraq under the OIF, the commanders considered the issues related to the amount of force, action plan concerning timelines and harmonization of air and ground command. While identifying the operational environment and planning, the commanders identified demographic, political, economic, and geographic and infrastructure related aspects.
The desired OE is much secure as the political, demographic, economic, geographical and infrastructural aspects would be supportive for US forces to enter and take hold of the land without any kind of resistance.
The strengths and weaknesses of the initial operational approach.
The military commanders also involved civilian organizations in the planning and supervision phases but the originals planning details were with the military authorities and some chosen people only.
Iraqis were previously informed about the invasion and they were promised for a better future.
Many alternative plans were developed with proper staff involvement and other agencies regarding the operational environment.
Termination of plan not executed fully.
Unaccomplished end state goals
Elements of Operational design most important to OIF planning and discuss. Objectives
Functions and Forces
Assessment of the campaign and refinement of operational approach over time
The commanders considered issues of force, action plan, air and ground command
General Tommy Franks, the commander of US CENTCOM was allocated for devising a plan
“Generated Start” plan in 2002 as first plan
CFACC disapproved of the plan
A substituted plan, “Running Start” was designed in order to control weapons of mass destruction
Hybrid plan was developed that was a mixture of the first two
In January 2003, plan was changed
Lacking thorough planning for post-war scenario
More risk involved because of incomplete assessment
More involvement of civil agencies than military ones
Department of State and Department of Defense were to assist the civil agencies
Anticipated military contribution in filling the gaps for stabilizing Iraq
Insufficient number of people for the operation
Conflict between the two major departments
No planning of provision of resources
DoD was unable to accommodate interagency strategic scheduling for stabilization mission
Unaccomplished end state goals
The degree to which current joint planning doctrine incorporates lessons from OIF
Partial success in the mission
End goals not achieved fully
Joint operational planning not fully applied on the mission