America's inability to prepare for war in times of non-war

America's inability to prepare for war in times of non-war

The 1990s saw peacekeeping become one of the U.S. military's most contentious missions. The underlying question was whether the American military should get involved in such operations at all, which question was part of a larger debate about whether peacekeeping was best undertaken by those whose primary mission was combat. A narrower question also arose: Were U.S. armed forces in particular suited to such tasks, schooled as they were in a doctrine that often appeared to favor overwhelming force over restraint? America's status as sole superpower argued both for and against its acceptance of peacekeeping missions. American military power carried with it a moral obligation to act in situations requiring peacekeepers, some contended, and any failure to do so risked damaging U.S. prestige. Moreover, America was often the only power militarily capable of taking action or of convincing others to do so. However, such action risked exposing U.S. peacekeepers to unacceptably high risks from adversaries who sought to inflate their own status by engaging the remaining superpower.

Such hesitation was compounded by what some saw as casualty aversion on the part of the U.S. public, politicians, and military chiefs. Episodes such as the American pullout from Somalia, the Harlan County incident in Haiti, and the refusal to become involved in Rwanda appeared to substantiate these views. Often, such casualty aversion clashed with demands that something be done to alleviate the humanitarian disasters made so painfully evident by the mass media. Some argued, however, against American involvement in peacekeeping unless a clear national interest was at stake—a position, they asserted, that was supported by the failed operation in Somalia, which had been undertaken for purely humanitarian reasons.

Some of the staunchest opposition to peacekeeping during this period originated in Congress, which was particularly concerned that it be consulted prior to any commitment of American troops as peacekeepers. The problem was partly addressed by the monthly meetings held by the Clinton administration to inform Congress on peace keeping operations, although sporadic attempts were made to introduce legislation that placed conditions on such deployments. Congress also expressed misgivings about the placing of American troops under U.N. control, although this became less of an issue as the decade progressed and the number of U.S. personnel under U.N. command declined.

By contrast, the question of American funding for peacekeeping operations proved thornier. Such funding had traditionally been less of an issue as the “ncremental” costs of such missions—the amount spent on them in addition to regularly anticipated costs—were relatively low. This changed when peacekeeping became a growth industry in the 1990s. Payment for its costs, which were drawn not from specific budget allocations but from supplemental appropriations, suddenly threatened to raise defense-spending levels above the caps set by Congress. An effort to address this was begun in 1996, and a special Department of Defense Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund was eventually established through which annual amounts were budgeted for ongoing peacekeeping ...