SOCRATES AND GOOD LIFE

Socrates' conception of good life in Euthyphro and Apology, and his idea of Good in Crito and Phaedo

Socrates' conception of good life in Euthyphro and Apology, and his idea of Good in Crito and Phaedo

Introduction

n The Last Days of Socrates, Plato begins with Euthyphro and we see the Socratic method in action. Socrates and Euthyphro talk about the environment of piety, and through a serious of considered provoking inquiries, Socrates argues for what he feels is the correct relationship between Man and God.

Next, Plato discusses the test of Socrates by the Athenian aristocracy. Again, we glimpse Socrates using his rhetorical abilities in illustrating the hypocrisy and prejudice pervading all through the Athenian government. Socrates talks about what function a good civilian should play in government. He broadcasts his being a "gadfly" on the hide of the establishment, and we furthermore find Socrates revealing his own understanding by claiming that he, in detail, knows very little. The Apology is by far my individual very popular section of the book.

In this they again echo Socrates—this time in his cell, logically demonstrating to his friend Crito justice of his own imminent execution (Plato, 2003).

The distinction between these two types of knowledge is crucial in understanding Aristotle's ethics. "Phronesis" is usually converted as 'practical wisdom,' and occasionally as 'prudence.' "Sophia" is usually converted 'knowledge.' In this transformation "phronesis" is converted as 'wisdom' and "sophia" is converted as 'intellectual accomplishment.' It is very significant to hold that in mind when you are reading the text, and if you are involved in Aristotle's considerations of prudential excellence. Anytime 'wisdom' seems in this text, Aristotle is conversing specifically about functional wisdom/phronesis, and likewise with 'intellectual accomplishment.' Any apparent vagueness on this note is due to the transformation, and candidly I'm surprised they determined to do that. Luckily I read Broadie's introduction, which mentions this on page 46, or additional I might have been confused about this subsequent on. Thus, one desires to be very cognizant that 'wisdom' in this translation is being mentioned to as a very specific kind of wisdom, namely the proficiency to cause practically.

The point is expressed felicitously, though I suspect unintentionally, when Jorgen Habermas writes in Structural Transformation of Public Sphere of "light-footed coercion" (leichtfüssiger Zwang) of argument—for no matter how light-footed reasons might be, they are still Zwang, they still aim at forcing the conclusion (Aristotle, 2005).

Discussion on Socrates View of Good Life

It was Socrates who submitted discourse to discipline of concept, raising it to level of universality; dialogues like Euthyphro have their foremost significance in precisely this turn away from immediacy of particular. The dialectic brought the powerful ruse by which to undermine authority of traditional practices: it asked for ratio behind them. It was demanded that they present themselves—to employ one of Kant's juridical metaphors—before court of reason. In fact demand was ingenuous, seeking as it did the answer in terms of the dualism that did not yet have ...