Socrates Meno Desire For Good Things

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Socrates Meno Desire for Good Things

Socrates Meno Desire for Good Things

Socrates Meno Desire for Good Things

Introduction

Meno is a Socratic dialogue in writing by Plato. Written in the Socratic dialectic method, it endeavours to determine the delineation of virtue, or arete, significance in this case virtue in general, rather than particular virtues (e.g., fairness, temperance, etc.). The aim is a widespread delineation that applies identically to all specific virtues. Socrates moves the consideration past the philosphical confusion, or aporia, conceived by Meno's paradox with the introduction of new Platonic concepts: the theory of information as recollection, anamnesis, and in the last lines a action in the direction of Platonic idealism.

Analysis

Plato's Meno is a Socratic dialogue in which the two major speakers, Socrates and Meno, talk about human virtue: if or not it can be educated, whether it is distributed by all human beings, and if it is one value or many. As is usual of a Socratic dialogue, there is more than one theme considered inside Meno. One characteristic of the dialogue is Socrates' use of one of Meno's slaves to illustrate his concept of anamnesis, that certain knowledge is innate and "recollected" by the soul from before birth. Another often documented characteristic of the dialogue is the brief look of Anytus, a constituent of a famous Athenian family who subsequent took part in the prosecution of Socrates.

Meno is travelling to Athens with a large entourage of slaves assisting him. Young, good-looking and well-born, Meno is perhaps a sophist from Thessaly, but Plato is not wholeheartedly clear about this. Meno says early on in the dialogue that he has held forward numerous times on the subject of virtue, and in front of large audiences.

The dialogue starts with Meno inquiring Socrates to notify him if virtue can be taught. Socrates says that he is clueless about what virtue is, and so is everyone else he knows (71b). Meno responds that virtue is different for different persons, that what is virtuous for a man is to perform himself in the city so that he assists his associates, injures his foes, and takes care all the while that he in person comes to no harm. Virtue is distinct for a woman, he says. Her domain is the administration of the house, and she is presumed to comply her husband. He says that children (male and female) have their own proper virtue, and so do vintage men -free- or slave, as you like (71e). Socrates says he finds this odd. He supposes that there should be some virtue widespread to all human beings.

Socrates declines the idea that human virtue counts on a person's gender or age. He directs Meno in the direction of the concept that virtues are common to all persons, that temperance ("sophrosynê"- exercising self command) and justice ("dikê, dikaiosynê"- refraining from harming other persons) are virtues even in young kids and vintage men (73b). Meno suggests to Socrates that the "capacity to govern men" may be a virtue common to ...
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