Conception of Justice

Introduction

John Stuart Mill was a major philosopher who made contributions to many areas of philosophy, including moral and political theory. He was the eldest son of James Mill, who held a senior administrative position in the East India Company, which looked after the affairs of British India. James Mill was a close friend and disciple of Jeremy Bentham, the founder of the doctrine of utilitarianism. According to utilitarianism, the rightness of an act depends on whether, among all the available alternatives, it maximizes the happiness of those affected by it. Utilitarian's take into account the various dimensions of happiness, such as its intensity, duration, and the number of people affected.

Liberty

The love of liberty, anxiety about its current state, and fear for its future dominated Mill's political theory. For him, a free and tolerant society was essential for people to realize their individualities and to attain what he called “the dignity of thinking beings.” The essay On Liberty, published in 1859, is rightly considered to be his major work in political theory. He warns against the “tyranny of the majority” in a democracy. The tyranny would find expression in oppressive laws and organized public opinion. The majority, with a uniform set of values and preferences, would be intolerant of conduct that they disliked or disapproved of. Mill argues that coercive interference with the conduct of individuals is never justified for a moralistic reason, that such conduct violates what the majority regards as the correct moral standards or for a paternalistic reason, that interference promotes the individual's own good. The only proper basis for interference is to prevent harm to others without their consent, although Mill also seems to allow for interference with acts that are public offensive nuisances, such as perhaps public sexual intercourse, that do not harm others in any ordinary sense. However, his remarks on such publicly offensive acts are passing, and he does not think that they bear on the central issue of liberty. Although he would certainly reject mere offense as a basis for interference, there is an important issue, which he does not discuss, as to when public offensive acts, which unavoidably intrude on people's daily activities, may be interfered with (Berger, 154).

The central reason for interference with individual conduct which Mill rules out as improper is moralistic. His examples include the prohibition of the eating of pork by Muslims when they are in the majority and the prohibition of Sunday trading by Christians. Majority disapproval of a form of conduct, however genuine or intense, is never a good reason for interference. Appeals to purely religious reasons, such as that the conduct in question is “forbidden and abhorred by the deity,” are never justified. Instead, it has to be shown that the conduct harms others without their consent.

Even then, the harm of the conduct must be weighed against any harm resulting from the interference. But there is no case for such balancing when the conduct is merely disliked or disapproved of. From this it ...